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Abstract: 
Increased demand for diminishing water resources has created the need 
for creative water management strategies. One technique perused in the 
western United States is the purchase of water rights by non-profit 
organizations for environmental in-stream uses. This paper looks at the 
Columbia Basin as a case study of the motivations of non-profit 
organizations. It shows how the institutional structure reduces transaction 
costs associated with water rights transfers and how non-profit 
organizations can incentivize water conservation in the western United 
States. 
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Water is the basis of life on earth. The efficient management of this precious resource is 
one of the most pressing environmental and social questions of this generation. Water is used for 
irrigation, household consumption, and industrial production. The western United States has 
been managing a diminishing water supply with increasing demand. Now many rivers are 
running low, creating problems for wildlife and endangering the continued use of a valuable 
resource. The Columbia River is the fourth largest river in the United States. The Columbia 
Basin incorporates many tributaries flowing through Idaho, Montana, Oregon and Washington, 
before emptying into the Pacific Ocean. In the Columbia River basin one effort for increasing in-
stream water flows has been the creation of a water rights transfer market, using environmental 
nonprofit organizations with the mission to restore rivers and riparian habitats.  
 
Using the Columbia River basin as a case study, this study will look at the different 
factors that impact the quantity and price of water transferred in environmental transactions to 
increase in-stream flows, and how the structure of the various nonprofit organizations contribute 
to the facilitation of the market.  
Figure 1: The Columbia River Basin 
and 11 sub basins. Source: CBWTP 
C h a m b e r s | 4 
 
The Structure of Western Water 
Water law in the western United States is dominated by two fundamental concepts. First is the 
prior appropriation of rights defined by Wyoming v. Colorado, 259 U.S. 419 (1922), known as 
the first in time, first in right doctrine. This stipulates that the land owner in a basin with the 
longest standing right to land in the area, regardless of geographical location, gets first allocation 
of water, and often, the largest quantity. The remaining water rights are structured hierarchally 
based on the age of the associated land right. Howe and Goemans (2003) showed that water 
rights with seniority have a higher price than those who don’t, but have little effect on quantity.  
The law creates unequal value of water within a basin. Not only does the senior right holder have 
the lowest risk associated with drought years but he/she is guaranteed his/her allotment 
regardless of the flow of water across years. The increased value of senior water is represented 
within transactions.  
The second related legal directive for western United States water law is the beneficial 
use, known as use it or loses it doctrine. Rights holders are required to use the complete state 
government allocated quota of water (stipulated by prior appropriations) for active “beneficial 
use,” or they are subject to forfeiture or abandonment of unused water in future water rights. The 
doctrine was instituted to prevent speculation and attempt to maximize the use of a scarce 
resource (Neuman, 1998). Similar to the rules implemented by Idaho, Montana and Washington, 
under Oregon’s Administrative Rules for water quality, beneficial uses include: 
• domestic water supply 
• fishing 
• industrial water supply 
• irrigation 
• water contact recreation 
• livestock watering 
• aesthetic quality 
• fish and aquatic life 
• hydropower 
• commercial navigation and transportation 
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Proving that an in-stream use of water is beneficial is often expensive. Many government issued 
permits and forms are required, as well as an administrative hearing (Jackson, 2009). Most 
irrigators do not want to spend the time or money to conserve water and avoid abandonment. The 
system has very little incentive for land owners to conserve water for ecosystem services, 
because of the risk of losing their current allocation of water. 
Therefore, there has been a move by the environmental community to increase the in-
stream flow of water by purchasing water rights from users for in-stream use, but often a lack of 
institutional support makes it difficult to have buyers find sellers. The difficulties associated with 
water markets create problems of asymmetric information. Combined with the stipulations of the 
prior appropriation doctrine there is little incentive for water conservation. 
The Bonneville Power Administration (BPA) is the federal government agency that is 
responsible for operating the system of federally owned hydropower plants (dams) within the 
Columbia River Basin. The agency generates power for the region, and sells it at cost. Due to 
proven adverse effects of dams the BPA is required to donate money (about $4 million annually) 
for environmental reconstruction in the area. BPA choose to fulfill this requirement by funding 
environmental water transfers within the basin. The BPA gave the National Fish and Wildlife 
Foundation administrative power of their mitigation funds. The BPA and the NFWF created a 
joint venture called the Columbia Basin Water Transactions Program (CBWTP) to facilitate 
funding of 10 “qualified local entities” (QLEs) , who negotiate voluntary water transfers in 
Oregon, Washington, Idaho and Montana and to assist landowners who wish to restore flows to 
existing habitat. 
Environmental water rights transfers usually take one of two forms: leases and sales. A 
lease is a temporary transfer of water. They specify quantities of water for certain durations of 
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time to be kept in-stream, and do not involve the sale of a water right. Sales are permanent 
transfers of whole or partial rights to water, where the new right holder has access to the 
specified quantity of water in perpetuity. Technically, under CBWTP there are no sales.  
Review of Literature  
 Until recently, environmental values of water have been unresearched and unobservable 
(Loomis et. al. 2003). Economic analyses have tended to focus on the multiple off-stream uses 
such as irrigation and urban and industrial uses (Lund and Israel, 2005). The only in-stream use 
that has been extensively researched is hydropower (Førsund 2007). Brewer et al. (2007) found 
that water rights prices in the western United States are higher for agriculture-to-urban trades 
relative to within-agriculture trades. This shows that if water was being allocated efficiently in 
the west, most water would be flowing into cities, not being used for agriculture. Young (1986) 
explores, within the conventional neoclassical framework, “Why are there so few transactions 
among water users?” He notes all of the reasons that water markets have unique characteristics 
and presents a simple model to explain the barriers to trade. He found the willingness to pay for 
water is not high at the margin, and that high transaction costs to negotiate purchase contracts 
and the interdependence of water users within a basin make it a hard commodity to trade in the 
open market. 
 Within the context of water rights transactions, there has been work concerning the 
determination of the value of in-stream flows. Griffin and Hsu (1993) show under frameworks 
that decrease the transaction costs and acknowledge the existence of low flow externalities, there 
are efficiency gains when in-stream flows have value. They conclude that giving in-stream users 
and environmental groups the ability to purchases in-stream rights will help reach a socially 
efficient level of in-stream flows. Current water management neglects the importance of 
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preserving in-stream flows. Livingston and Miller (1986) acknowledge a fundamental equity 
issue concerning valued in-stream flows. They contend that within water markets there is a 
conflict of interest between those who transfer for agricultural economic reasons and transfers 
for in-stream use. They say that increasing the choice domain of one group, limits the choices of 
the alternative group. 
 The institution of economic incentives for land conservation has been discussed 
throughout economic literature (e.g. Boyd, 2000), but analyses of incentives for water 
conservation have been a new development. Loomis (1987), one of the first scholars to attempt 
to determine the value of in-stream flows, found that marginal values of in-stream flows vary 
significantly with level of stream flow. Specifically he reported extreme values of $0.50 to $74 
per acre foot. His work has shown that in-stream uses of water do have value for wildlife, 
recreation, water quality, decreased risk of drought conditions and aesthetics. Loomis et al. (2003) 
showed that over $100 million of water was traded for a variety of environmental reasons from 
1998-2003.  
 Another challenge concerning water transactions is the relationship with the value of the 
adjacent land. Giving water value in a separate market apart from land will decrease the value of 
land for all the farmers in the area. The value of land, due to the prior appropriations law, is tied 
to water rights. Separating the water right from the land could cause secondary costs due to the 
loss of capital (the water) on the land (Dinar et al., 1997). Water rights holders will not sell their 
water for environmental reasons unless they can at least cover the lost capital value of their land. 
Occasionally, water rights transfers include a transfer of land rights as well. 
 Garrick et al. (2009) argue that for water transfer markets to be successful there needs to 
be an institutional structure that can establish credible baselines, facilitate procedures and rules, 
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and create successful monitoring and compliance regimes. Neuman (2004) argues that the use of 
non-profits to restore in-stream flows is a “fair, effective, and efficient approach.” By examining 
their legal and institutional structure, King (2004) discusses how water trust non-profits fit into 
the conservation field, and argues that the legal nuances of western water law have created 
unique entities. He argues that compared to land conservation non-profits, the legal structure of 
water law have led non-profits to prefer temporary leases over permanent acquisitions, and to 
partner with public agencies. Findings that are evident in the structure and actions of nonprofits 
in the Columbia River Basin.  
Theory 
 Theories of conservation have changed over the last 50 years. Conservation theory 
originated with Arthur Cecil Pigou, an English economist who first realized the economics of 
conservation in 1957. Pigou was interested in question of the optimal intertemporal utilization of 
the fixed natural resource stocks. Now questions have turned to providing unspoiled natural 
environments for future generations (Krutilla, 1967).  
 There are multiple negative externalities related to allowing river basins to operate with 
low flows of water. Many studies have shown that over use of water supplies can have 
intertemporal effects (e.g. Zeitouni, Dinar, 1997; Chandrakanth, Alemu, Bhat, 2004), for 
example, lower flows in following years and inter-basin effects. Some negative environmental 
externalities include: harmful impacts to marine species, riparian vegetation loss and decreases in 
water quality. River basins with higher costs of low water flows are more valuable for 
conservation. For example the Washington State Department of Ecology has listed 16 river 
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basins where low flows are a known limiting factor to salmon populations1 and the Oregon State 
Water Resources Department has declared 7 critical groundwater areas2.  
The economic benefits of water conservation are represented in different ways. Daubert 
and Young, (1981) and Loomis and Creel (1992) showed that water level is an important 
determinant in the value of water related recreational activities. Increased water flows can also 
help to mitigate the negative effects that drought years may have on a basin (Ward and 
Michelsen, 2002). Keeping a water right in-stream provides a public good for the basin by 
adding insurance against dry conditions (Smith and Lenhart, 1996).  
Irrigated land with a scarce or diminishing supply of water has large potential economic 
efficiency gains from conservation and the reallocation of water among users (Easter et.al, 1998). 
Economists (e.g. Burness and Quirk, 1980, Johansson 2000) argue that giving water a price can 
have the market reflect scarcity. This has been difficult to accomplish in the Western United 
States due to political pressure from agricultural communities. The solution was to create a 
market for water rights transfers, therefore changing the incentives and hopefully encouraging 
conservation.  
These markets are difficult to implement due to high transaction costs. Transactions costs 
are factors that prevent markets from operating efficiently (Coase 1960). Water markets in the 
western United States are characterized by transaction costs sustained by searching for trading 
partners, characterizing water commodities, price negotiations and legal fees associated with the 
transfer (Colby 1990). High transaction costs lower the quantity and increase the price of 
                                                 
1
 The critical basins are: Lower Yakima, Methow, Middle Snake, Naches, Okanogan, Upper Yakima, Walla Walla, 
WenatcheeCedar-Sammamish, Chambers-Clover, Elwha-Dungeness, Green-Duwamish, Nooksack, Puyallup-White, 
Quilcene-Snow and Snohomish. Source: www.ecy.wa.gov.  
2
 The critical areas are Cow Valley near Vale; The Dalles in Wasco County; Cooper Mountain-Bull Mountain 
southwest of Beaverton and Tigard; and the Butter Creek, Ordnance (alluvial and basalt) and Stage Gulch areas in 
Morrow and Umatilla Counties. Source: www.oregon.gov  
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transfers. In the Columbia River Basin, open market water transfers are legal, but because of 
transaction costs they don’t often occur. The institutional structure created by CBWTP allows 
non-profit organizations to lower transaction costs for environmental water transfers for in-
stream use.    
Agricultural irrigation, urban consumption and industrial production are the three primary 
uses of water in the United States (Lund and Israel, 2005). Irrigation withdrawals represent 40 
percent of total freshwater withdrawals and 65 percent of total freshwater withdrawals for all 
categories excluding thermoelectric power. Urban and industrial uses of water are about 18 
percent of total freshwater withdrawals and nearly 30 percent of total freshwater withdrawals for 
all categories excluding thermoelectric power3. There is an assumed positive relationship 
between population and water consumption for both domestic urban uses and industrial 
(Algharian et al. 1955). Prior appropriation legally ties water rights to land. Therefore, an 
opportunity cost associated with selling a water right is selling the land and water rights together 
in a land market. Market land prices have a positive relationship with the prices in the water 
rights market (Crouter, 1987). 
Water rights transfers have occurred in the Columbia River Basin for other than 
environmental motivations. This indicates that in some cases transaction costs are low enough to 
facilitate market action. Furthermore this could signify that selling water to environmental non-
profits may indicate some value in the transaction for environmental factors. Loomis and White 
(1996) found that Americans have an annual willingness to pay of $88 to protect pacific salmon 
and steelhead, an endangered species in the Columbia River basin. Sellers who consider their 
value for conservation transact higher quantities and prices over the purely economically rational 
sellers (Colby 1990).    
                                                 
3
 USGS estimation of water use in the United States 
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Data 
 The basis of the data on individual environmental water transfers came from the CBWTP 
directly. Their website (www.cbwtp.org) allows access to their database of all transactions since 
the inception of the program in 2002. The data includes the specifications of the transactions, 
basin and watershed features and individual seller characteristics. The data is aggregated from 
transaction proposal forms submitted to the program by QLEs as a request for funds. These 
proposal forms are usually between 15 and 20 pages long and contain all (and more) the 
information found on the database. 
 The data acquired from CBWTP incorporated information on 255 transactions conducted 
in Idaho, Montana, Oregon and Washington. The data include 8 QLEs: Clark Fork Coalition 
(CFC), Deschutes River Conservancy (DRC), Idaho Department of Water Resources (IDWR), 
The Freshwater Trust (TFT), Trout Unlimited - Washington Water Project (TU-WWP), Trout 
Unlimited-MT Water Project (TU-MWP), Walla Walla Watershed Alliance (WWWA), and  
Washington Water Trust (WWT). It should be noted that IDWR is not a non-profit institution but 
a state government agency and although there is some deviation from the averages, under 
CBWTP, they are treated the same as the rest of the QLEs and are included in the analysis for 
robustness (see appendix 1). The transactions by QLEs ranged from 1 transaction conducted by 
WWWA to 55 conducted by WWT. Table 1 shows the number of transactions across entities.   
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Table 1: Transactions across QLEs 
QLE # of 
Transactions 
Clark Fork Coalition 34 
Deschutes River Conservancy 35 
Idaho Department of Water Resources 51 
The Freshwater Trust 44 
Trout Unlimited - Washington Water 
Project 
20 
Trout Unlimited-MT Water Project 14 
Walla Walla Watershed Alliance 1 
Washington Water Trust 55 
Total 255 
Source: CBWTP 
Data for the population variable was from the U.S. Census Bureau county population 
estimates. The values were determined by finding the average population of all the counties for 
which the transaction’s sub-basin flowed through. These quantities reflect the population in the 
year in which the transaction was proposed. 
 The Census of Agriculture was the source for the market yield and land value variables. 
Data for 2002 and 2007 were collected. Therefore, for all the transactions that were proposed 
between 2002 and 2006 we used data from the 2002 census, and for all the transactions between 
2007 and 2010 we used data from the 2007 census.  
Evidence 
 For this study uses two, two stage least squares regressions to determine the effects of 
independent variables on the water quantity and prices involved in transactions conducted and 
funded by CBWTP. Both of the dependent variables are endogenous. The first dependent 
variable, ACFT, is the average total in-stream acre feet per transaction. An identical independent 
variable appears in the price model. The second dependent variable is COST. COST is the total 
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cost incurred by the QLE for the transaction. This is the price of the water right minus funds 
given to the QLE by CBWTP for the transaction. An identical independent variable appears in 
the quantity model.  
Quantity model: 
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Variables 
The variable YLD attempts to proxy the opportunity cost value of irrigation water. 
Empirically it is the average market value of agricultural products sold per farm in the sub-basin. 
The farmers who cite irrigation as their primary water use is represented by the dummy variable 
IRR, which is 1 if irrigation was the primary use and 0 if it is not.  The YLD value differentiates 
sub basins in which either irrigators have, lower marginal costs for growing crops, or higher 
marginal revenue for agricultural products. This variable encompasses factors such as: soil 
quality, government regulations, climate, biodiversity, and regional price differences.  
 Urban and industrial uses of water are incorporated into the POP variable. POP is the 
average population in the sub basin. Population is a proxy for different urban and industrial uses 
across sub-basins.   
 LAND and is the estimated market value of land and buildings per farm for each 
transaction. LAND represents the value of the benefits forgone by the sellers if they were to sell 
their water right on the open market. Due to a lack of a consistent water market with reliable 
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prices, the land market is the best alternative. The value of the water right is incorporated into the 
land price because they are usually sold together.  
 The dummy variables THREAT and ENDANG are equal to 1 if the water transaction 
affected a stream in which a threatened or endangered, respectively, lives. Otherwise the value of 
the variable is 0. These two variables try to proxy the importance of environmentalism in 
determining the quantity of water involved in the transaction.  
 Within the proposals submitted to CBWTP QLEs were asked to specify the right seller’s 
primary rationale for transferring their water. Four different designations were determined for the 
purposes of this study4: (1) economic, (2) conservation, (3) a combination of economic and 
conservation, and (4) legal, reasons.  CONV, EC\CO and LAW are dummy variables whose 
value is 1 if the respective variable is the motivation in the transaction by the seller. CONV is if 
the seller reported acting for conservation reasons, EC\CO is if the seller is acting for economic 
reasons combined with conservation reasons and LAW is if the seller is acting for a legal reason, 
for example avoid beneficial use requirement violations. These variables are all relative to sellers 
who report acting in transactions for economic reasons.  
 Based on the prior appropriations doctrine water rights are valued differently 
based on the time of their right. The dummy variable SNR is a 1 if the right is the most senior 
water right on the stream and a 0 if it is not. This variable will describe the influence of the prior 
appropriation doctrine. TERM is a variable that designates the years of the lease agreement 
(from 1-100).  
The instrumental variables for the quantity model are STREAMFLOW and LOWFLOW. 
STREAMFLOW is the average cubic feet per second of the stream for which the transaction 
                                                 
4
 The proposal form’s responses for this data were free response. The values for this characterization where done by 
the researcher as objectively as possible by reading the responses and attempting to determine the intent of the seller. 
In some cases the responses were very straight forward and obvious which did not require and subjective decisions.  
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benefited for the 5 years prior to the lease. LOWFLOW is a dummy variable for which the value 
is 1 if the flow is 10 cfs or lower and 0 if it is above. These variables are valid instrumental 
values because of the assumed motivations of the non-profits operating under CBWTP. QLEs are 
first and foremost attempting to raise water levels by purchasing rights and keeping the water in-
stream. Secondly they also have benchmark water levels that are scientifically established water 
level goals that are required for stream well being. This implies that changes in stream flow will 
affect the quantity variable and not the price variable. Changes in stream flow will not affect 
price because the QLEs value increased stream flow over price, due to their motivations, non-
profit status and funding from CBWTP5.  
 The instrumental variable for the price model is ACAP. In some of the transactions 
studied, there was land also transferred to the non-profits with the water rights. Land sold with 
water transactions is referred to as appurtenant land. ACAP is a variable incorporating the 
quantity of the acres of land, if any, acquired appurtenant to the water transaction. This variable 
is a viable instrument because having land sold with the water increases the price, but shouldn’t 
affect the quantity. The reasoning is similar to the quantity instruments. QLEs are concerned 
with increasing the quantity of water to meet environmental benchmarks. Because of outside 
funding, from CBWTP, price is a less important determinant of the QLEs behavior.       
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
5
 The search for an instrumental variable for the quantity model resulted in very few valid options. I chose my 
instrumental variables because they had the strongest theoretical argument to back them up. It is worth noting that 
although neither STREAMFLOW nor LOWFLOW are statistically significant in the results of the quantity model. 
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Quantity Model:  
Table 2: Regression Results for Quantity Model 
Quantity Model  Coefficients Standard 
Error 
z-Stat P-value 
Intercept 285751.7 24237.54 11.79 0 
COST 0.147003 0.091408 1.61 0.108 
TERM -64.5354 123.3777 -0.52 0.601 
IRR -280599 22489.34 -12.48 0 
THREAT 2640.454 10998.25 0.24 0.81 
ENDANG  34491.71 14764.03 2.34 0.019 
SNR -10895 9859.618 -1.11 0.269 
POP 0.001956 0.013817 0.14 0.887 
YLD 0.006447 0.071284 0.09 0.928 
LAND -2.87705 4.799335 -0.6 0.549 
CONV -97.2532 9471.413 -0.01 0.992 
EC\CO 3209.924 16551.58 0.19 0.846 
LAW (omitted) 
  
 
STREAMFLOW 0.195031 3.075456 0.06 0.949 
LOWFLOW 3218.644 11367.43 0.28 0.777 
 
Price Model:  
Table 3: Regression Results for Price Model 
Price Model  Coefficients Standard 
Error 
t Stat P-value 
Intercept (omitted) 
   ACFT 0.59222 0.213885 2.77 0.006 
TERM 579.5803 286.9427 2.02 0.043 
IRR 24393.77 27819.49 0.88 0.381 
THREAT 55164.87 23848.54 2.31 0.021 
ENDANG  25574.96 35994.09 0.71 0.477 
ACAP -1.03232 3.926861 -0.26 0.793 
SNR 22827.2 23932.77 0.95 0.34 
POP 0.098591 0.03091 3.19 0.001 
YLD -0.30418 0.175774 -1.73 0.084 
LAND -25.1697 12.82343 -1.96 0.05 
CONV 30176.91 23442.16 1.29 0.198 
EC\CO -7489.62 40671.36 -0.18 0.854 
LAW 175359.2 63687 2.75 0.006 
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Results 
The value reported for COST in the quantity model is barley insignificant at the 10% 
level with a z-statistic of 1.61. However, if you consider the one-sided test of significance, the 
value is statistically significant at the 10% level when the t-statistic is above a value of 1.28. 
Originally there was suspected correlation problems, however this turned out to be insignificant. 
This implies an unexplained force that may be pushing up the standard error6.  
The value for ACFT in an OLS regression7 reported a coefficient of 1.09. This value is 
twice as much as the two-stage regression. This implies an upward bias in the coefficient based 
on the endogeneity of the two variables across both regressions. Otherwise the minute changes in 
coefficients imply that the endogeneity problem does not extend to other variables. 
The regressional analysis returned results which are to be expected from a working 
market. First, there is a relationship between quantity and price for which an increase in quantity 
increases the price of the transaction, and an increase in price increases the quantity. This shows 
that the structure established by CBWTP and the QLEs has adequately lowered the transaction 
costs associated with water transactions in the western United States. Normal market responses 
of quantity and price show that with lower transaction costs water markets have the potential to 
operate efficiently.  
Another result of the analysis concerns the protection of public goods. Endangered and 
threatened species have many values: (1) use value, such as viewing animals or fishing (Loomis 
and White,1996), (2) existence value, or the satisfaction gain from knowing that a particular 
species has a healthy existence (Loomis and White, 1996), and (3) because extinction 
irreversibly narrows the reservoir of potential resources (Bishop, 1978). The regressional 
                                                 
6
 See appendix 3 
7
 See appendix 2 
C h a m b e r s | 18 
 
analysis indicates significant environmental factors of quantity and price. The quantity model 
shows streams with endangered species have a significant higher quantity of water transacted 
than those that don’t. Environmentalism is also evident in the price model. Transactions on 
streams that contain threatened species will have a higher price than those that don’t by about 
$50,000.   
Endangered species are considered a public good, in need of protection (Coursey, 2001). 
The analysis confirms Loomis and White’s (1996) conclusion that water rights holders have a 
value for endangered species. Second, it could indicate that QLEs are successfully fulfilling their 
mission statements by focusing their informational resources on sub-basins that require the most 
protection. Consequently, higher prices indicate that the non-profit institutions have a higher 
willingness to pay for water that helps threatened species. This confirms that the QLEs involved 
in CBWTP are attempting to restore more critical river ecosystems and providing the function of 
protecting endangered species. 
 The theory suggests that opportunity costs (represented by POP, YLD and LAND) should 
be important factors of quantity and price. This is partially confirmed by the empirical analysis. 
The variables POP, YLD and LAND were all significant in the price model and not the quantity 
model.  
POP represents the opportunity costs of domestic urban and industrial uses of water and 
so the positive relationship is expected (Algharian et al. 1955). County populations in the 
Columbia River Basin span from Multnomah County, OR, with over 700,000 residents, to Clark 
County, ID, with less than 1000. This population disparity says that transactions in Multnomah 
County will be $69,000 more, than in Clark County. This is another indication that the market is 
working under normal conditions and opportunity costs are affecting market actions.  
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 For YLD, the model gave a negative coefficient. One possible explanation for this value 
is that as the productivity of land goes up the need for water goes down. The soil is more 
efficient, so less additional irrigation is needed with higher yielding land. Another explanation 
could be in the different water needs of high yield crops in each sub-basin in different years.  
 LAND also reported a negative coefficient. This value could be explained by land 
speculation. As cities continue to grow there will be an increasing demand for land to contribute 
to urbanization. More developers will buy agricultural land for speculative purposes. Therefore 
as land prices in a sub basin increase there could be a decrease in the associated water right. This 
would be because the land owners are not currently using the land and lease out the unused water 
right.  
 The lack of significance in the variables on the quantity side could be explained by the 
leasing mechanisms utilized under the current framework. The average lease length, excluding 
100 year terms, is about 4.5 years. Because sellers are not relinquishing water for long periods of 
time, the opportunity costs are not fully actuated.    
Non-profits 
 Weisbrod (1986) first suggested that non-profits serve as private producers of public 
goods. He argued that the government, with a re-election constraint, will never provide the 
efficient amount of public good production.  Non-profits also can be less bureaucratic and less 
costly than a similar government program or agency (Hansmann, 1987).  
In this case study there are two layers of nonprofits. First, following the Hansmann 
argument, the BPA is ill equipped and too big, operating 31 hydro electric dams in the basin, to 
efficiently allocate funds. Therefore, they partnered with NFWF to cut down on transaction costs 
associated with funding water transfer projects in the basin. Secondly, the CBWTP created a 
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system to allocate funds, rather than distributing themselves. Delegation could be for regional 
bureaucratic efficiency. Each non-profit operates in specific regions, overlapping very little. The 
non-profits may also have preexisting positive relationships with the community, or a better 
understanding of local hydrology.    
The BPA and CBWTP have constructed a system in which they limit their funding to 10 
QLEs to insure the fulfillment of their mission to “support innovative, voluntary, grassroots, 
water transactions that improve flows to tributary streams and rivers in the communities of the 
Columbia Basin.”  
This system is set up to insure that water transactions occur at the lowest cost to BPA. 
Only about 14% of transactions are fully funded by CBWTP. The majority of transactions are 
supplemented with funds from the QLEs. For-profit institutions have little incentive to act in a 
market with non-profits who get contributions from private donations and corporate sponsorship. 
Because of the high transaction costs associated with water market trades (Colby, 1990) for 
profit firms have little incentives to enter this market, even if they were allowed.  
Secondly, non-profits signal to farmers that they are not being taken advantage of. In the 
western United States agricultural communities are very skeptical of reallocation of water. There 
are two major fears associated with water transactions. First, it is possible that with fewer actors 
in the local agricultural economy the costs associated with public operating and maintenance, for 
example the up keep of communal canals, with fall more heavily on those remaining. Secondly, 
there is a fear that in-stream transfers in particular could lower the number of farmers and cause 
water to flow to urban areas, which could affect the viability of the local agricultural economy 
(Jaeger, 2004).   
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Conclusion 
 This analysis returned two important results. First, the superstructure of non-profit 
organizations in the Columbia River Basin has adequately lowered transaction costs to facilitate 
market transactions. Furthermore, the involvement of non-profit organizations in the market 
gives in-stream flows value and funding from CBWTP creates an incentive for water 
conservation. Although this study does well at showing market action and seller motivations, 
there is little explanation of decision making by non-profit organizations. Water markets are 
complex entities that are hard to quantify. More work is needed to refine valuation methods and 
create tools and incentives to increase water conservation through economic methods. 
 The data indicates an ability of non-profit organizations to lower transaction costs in 
water rights markets. Therefore a possible policy consideration is the creation of an auction 
system for tradable water rights. Auctions can mitigate problems with inefficiently distributed 
rights and can direct revenues toward economically desirable outcomes (Conner, Ward, and 
Bryan, 2008). However auctions are costly to design and administer (Libecap, 2009). Non-profit 
organizations could lower the costs for design, operation, administration, funding and evaluation. 
They could also insure that conservation is accounted for. A significant decrease in the 
associated cost would make auctions a feasible policy option for Western States. An auction 
system would require a redistribution of existing water rights. This would be a very unpopular 
procedure originally; however there has been success with such policies in both Australia 
(Garrick et. al., 2009) and Chile (Alevy, Cristi, and Melo, 2010). Non-profit organizations as 
administrators of conservation programs can be a cost efficient way to find socially economic 
equilibriums.     
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 Appendix 1 
 
 
Table 4: Comparison of IDWR data 
Average water cost (per acre ft) Average 
quantity 
Percent of 100 
year leases 
IDWR 20.95544 6599.962 13.70% 
total 30.96774 19885.19 19.20% 
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Appendix 2: OLS Regressions 
Quantity Model (OLS) Coefficients Standard 
Error 
t Stat P-value 
Intercept 277393.4 28975.78 9.57 0 
COST 0.190727 0.02413 7.9 0 
TERM -99.5063 118.1284 -0.84 0.4 
IRR -270764 26067.07 -10.39 0 
THREAT -967.634 9689.805 -0.1 0.921 
ENDANG  31401.02 14190.19 2.21 0.028 
ACAP 1.524714 1.601328 0.95 0.342 
SNR -13100.4 9887.368 -1.32 0.186 
POP -0.00158 0.013131 -0.12 0.905 
YLD 0.013503 0.07301 0.18 0.853 
LAND -1.83964 5.440932 -0.34 0.736 
CONV -976.364 9628.799 -0.1 0.919 
EC\CO 3811.292 16674.26 0.23 0.819 
LAW -8458.75 26603.4 -0.32 0.751 
STREAMFLOW -0.77858 2.424139 -0.32 0.748 
LOWFLOW 1907.831 11699.45 0.16 0.871 
 
 
Price Model (OLS) Coefficients Standard 
Error 
t Stat P-value 
Intercept -194663 80545.23 -2.42 0.016 
ACFT 1.090127 0.137921 7.9 0 
TERM 487.5056 281.0644 1.73 0.084 
IRR 186445.7 74150.71 2.51 0.013 
THREAT 52139.49 22918.46 2.27 0.024 
ENDANG  19632.44 34248.69 0.57 0.567 
ACAP -0.92086 3.835184 -0.24 0.81 
SNR 29542.86 23647.77 1.25 0.213 
POP 0.078288 0.030981 2.53 0.012 
YLD -0.29736 0.173493 -1.71 0.088 
LAND -17.8491 12.95945 -1.38 0.17 
CONV 32149.87 22925.96 1.4 0.162 
EC\CO -17056.6 39852.91 -0.43 0.669 
LAW 162970.4 62732.17 2.6 0.01 
STREAMFLOW 19.39842 5.658729 3.43 0.001 
LOWFLOW -92.9575 27971.93 0 0.997 
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Appendix 3: Correlation Test 
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Appendix 4: Descriptive Statistics 
ACFT   COST   TERM   IRR   
        
Mean 
19885.1
9 Mean 
53709.8
2 Mean 
23.4842
5 Mean 
0.96850
4 
Standard 
Error 
5878.36
2 
Standard 
Error 
12523.7
7 
Standard 
Error 
2.43347
7 
Standard 
Error 0.01098 
Median 916.825 Median 625 Median 3 Median 1 
Mode 91 Mode 0 Mode 1 Mode 1 
Standard 
Deviation 
93685.6
8 
Standard 
Deviation 199596 
Standard 
Deviation 
38.7832
4 
Standard 
Deviation 
0.17499
9 
Range 
100000
0 Range 2187924 Range 99 Range 1 
Minimum 0 Minimum -3896 Minimum 1 Minimum 0 
Maximum 
100000
0 Maximum 2184028 Maximum 100 Maximum 1 
Sum 
505083
9 Sum 
1364229
5 Sum 5965 Sum 246 
Count 254 Count 254 Count 254 Count 254 
THREAT   ENDANG   ACAP   SNR   
        
Mean 
0.57480
3 Mean 
0.13385
8 Mean 
444.715
1 Mean 
0.33858
3 
Standard 
Error 
0.03108
1 
Standard 
Error 
0.02140
7 
Standard 
Error 
179.926
6 
Standard 
Error 
0.02975
2 
Median 1 Median 0 Median 11.5 Median 0 
Mode 1 Mode 0 Mode 0 Mode 0 
Standard 
Deviation 
0.49534
9 
Standard 
Deviation 
0.34117
2 
Standard 
Deviation 
2867.55
8 
Standard 
Deviation 
0.47416
2 
Range 1 Range 1 Range 43945 Range 1 
Minimum 0 Minimum 0 Minimum 0 Minimum 0 
Maximum 1 Maximum 1 Maximum 43945 Maximum 1 
Sum 146 Sum 34 Sum 
112957.
6 Sum 86 
Count 254 Count 254 Count 254 Count 254 
 
  
C h a m b e r s | 31 
 
POP   YLD   LAND   CONV   
        Mean 262592.2 Mean 116229.6 Mean 1837.372 Mean 0.429134 
Standard 
Error 33734.46 
Standard 
Error 4396.803 
Standard 
Error 79.49079 
Standard 
Error 0.031117 
Median 140617 Median 103349 Median 1623.75 Median 0 
Mode 140617 Mode 80430.2 Mode 1623.75 Mode 0 
Standard 
Deviation 537638.9 
Standard 
Deviation 70073.5 
Standard 
Deviation 1266.875 
Standard 
Deviation 0.49593 
Range 2969003 Range 272492.5 Range 8828.2 Range 1 
Minimum 11469 Minimum 9623 Minimum 386.8 Minimum 0 
Maximum 2980472 Maximum 282115.5 Maximum 9215 Maximum 1 
Sum 66698411 Sum 29522329 Sum 466692.6 Sum 109 
Count 254 Count 254 Count 254 Count 254 
EC\CO   LAW   STREAMFLOW   LOWFLOW   
        Mean 0.090551 Mean 0.035433 Mean 1096.64 Mean 0.200787 
Standard 
Error 0.018042 
Standard 
Error 0.011623 
Standard 
Error 125.5347 
Standard 
Error 0.025185 
Median 0 Median 0 Median 130.1333 Median 0 
Mode 0 Mode 0 Mode 5533.1 Mode 0 
Standard 
Deviation 0.287536 
Standard 
Deviation 0.185237 
Standard 
Deviation 2000.694 
Standard 
Deviation 0.40138 
Range 1 Range 1 Range 10081.3 Range 1 
Minimum 0 Minimum 0 Minimum 0 Minimum 0 
Maximum 1 Maximum 1 Maximum 10081.3 Maximum 1 
Sum 23 Sum 9 Sum 278546.6 Sum 51 
Count 254 Count 254 Count 254 Count 254 
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Appendix 5: Explanation of Variables 
 
Variable Explanation 
ACFT Average total in-stream acre feet per transaction 
COST Total cost incurred by the QLE for the transaction 
TERM Term of the transaction in years 
IRR 1 if irrigation was the primary use and 0 if it is not 
THREAT 1 if stream has threatened species and 0 if it is not 
ENDANG  1 if stream has endangered species and 0 if it is not 
ACAP quantity of the acres of land, if any, acquired appurtenant to the water 
transaction 
SNR 1 if the right is the most senior in the primary reach and 0 if it is not 
POP Average population in the sub basin 
YLD Average market value of agricultural products sold per farm in the sub-basin 
LAND Estimated market value of land and buildings per farm for each transaction 
CONV 1 if seller cited conservation as motivation and 0 if it is not 
EC\CO 1 if seller cited economic reasons mixed with conservation as motivation and 0 
if it is not 
LAW 1 if seller cited legal requirements as motivation and 0 if it is not 
